It would be hard to overstate how delighted I am with yesterday’s performance, and in particular that of the manager. Football management is one of the toughest jobs there is and it didn’t get any easier when the Collyer Brothers released their seismic classic Championship Manager back in 1992.
I have been a fan of their games ever since.
Football Manager 2018 came out in October of last year; I have 320 hours “in game” already.
It is the game that made everyone think that they, too, were tactical geniuses. More even than those who scrutinise the tactics boards on Sky Sports and who believe being able to makes you a know-all, Football Manager has spawned an entire generation who believe they can second guess the boss of their club and see mistakes he can’t.
This will sound absurdly geeky – this is what the game does to you – but I actually read tactics guides and books on the subject, the better to understand the game of football itself and so that I can be better at the simulated version of it. But the difference between a novice like me and someone who genuinely understands football is night and day. There are things in those books which baffle me. The complexity of tactical analysis is far beyond my ability to comprehend it, and I try hard.
But even an understanding of the A-B-C’s tells you that what Brendan did yesterday was superb and that Murty was bamboozled by it.
It’s clear that Murty has a depth of knowledge of football that is embarrassingly vast compared to my own limited understanding of it but yesterday, when we went down to ten men I asked the gang I was watching the match with how long they thought it would take before he made the tactical decision that seemed obvious; bringing on Cummings and going two up front?
I asked the question sarcastically.
Because I believed that it would be a mistake, and it was.
By the time he had did it, Brendan was already miles in front of him and had already countered the move.
Brendan saw, clearly, what was in front of him … and he knew what he needed to change.
To understand how brilliant his analysis of the situation was, and how little room for manoeuvre he left Murty, we need to look at how the tactical side of the game played out. I am not even going to pretend that this is professional analysis; this is amateurish at best.
But I hope I understand the A-B-C’s enough to be able to try.
Let’s start with an understanding of how Celtic lines up.
Celtic’s Tactics On The Day: The Brendan Rodgers 4-2-3-1.
We lined up yesterday with Brendan’s standard 4-2-3-1.
Ajer played in the uncustomary right back role.
He was ripe for being terrorised all day long, as he was going up against Murphy, who their fans think is some sort of hot shot. Had Lustig been fit the system would have incorporated Tierney and him as wing backs rather than as straight up left and right backs … Kieran was played much deeper than usual.
We employed what seemed to be a two man central midfield, with Rogic playing in the hole behind Dembele.
But in actual fact, he played deeper to counter their own midfield duo of Docherty and Goss. Sevco’s formation was actually identical to ours, but whilst Rogic did play in that more withdrawn role, Windass was pushed further forward.
He took advantage of Boyata’s error; look how far in front of the midfield he was playing. That’s what Dedryk underestimated and it led to the goal. Rogic’s run comes from deeper. It had to be perfect, and it was.
Windass’ position could have caused our defence trouble all day long, had they been able to get the ball through to him.
But Brown and Ntcham played very deep, and that cut off the supply.
Rogic allowed us to get the ball forward at pace.
It was a perfect setup from Brendan, and obviously the result of having watched Sevco’s games.
With Windass unable to influence the game, that left Sevco only with attacks from out wide. It was from there –they got goal number two with the run and the cross down our weakened right side. The cross into the box wasn’t defended properly and Candelas ghosted in.
The thing is, they created next to nothing on the left, and they did little on the right either. Their failure to properly exploit our right side, which was obvious all day long, showed how unable Murty was to put together a coherent plan, and that, crucially, led Brendan to the biggest call of the day.
The Red Card Forces Brendan To Ditch The Extra Midfielder And Go 4-2-2-1.
The red card forced Brendan to confront his options.
Sevco’s deep defence had kept Rogic at bay for much of the game.
His goal was exceptional, but he was constantly running into their bank of players.
When Simunvoic was sent off we needed to keep things tight.
The decision to take off Rogic was risky but it was the right one.
We had sacrificed our additional man, and our attacking midfield threat, but that had been necessary to keep things bottled up at the back. The risk was not, as Sevco fans seem to think, that they take off a midfielder to bring on Cummings. It was that they make a double change, and go to a 4-3-1-2.
That would have given them a man advantage in the middle of the park and the extra man up front to boot. Their three-man central midfield would have found it easier to win the crucial battle there, and they’d have had three against two in the final third. Their advantage was in the middle … if Murty had pressed it.
We persevered with the two wingers for only seven minutes.
Brendan knew that the wide players – on both sides – were having little joy against packed penalty boxes and with both teams playing one man up front. He knew their attacking midfielder Windass was as well not being on the park. He seemed to be facing the dilemma of how to do more with less ….
But Brendan knew were the real battle was being fought.
And with Murty not willing to exploit his advantage, Brendan gambled instead.
Brendan Sacrifices Width To Go 4-3-2 … And Central Midfield Superiority Wins The Day.
As I said, very little was happening yesterday out wide.
Candelas had scored, but for most part Sevco had absolutely failed to exploit our weak right flank, with Ajer playing out of position, until he was moved inside when Hendry came on. On the other side of the park, Kieran’s forward running had been restricted by the absence of his usual partner Sinclair and the absence of the balancing Lustig on the right.
Crucially, this negated Sevco’s attacking threat down that side.
Forrest had not found much joy against their packed defence, and neither had McGregor.
It was a perfectly logical move to consider ditching width to restore our man advantage in midfield. Their defence was coping with two wingers and one striker … but Brendan knew they would be vulnerable to a formation which utilised two.
Moving McGregor inside to play in his natural position forced Sevco to try to mark 3 with 2 again.
The dilemma was how to do that, and also keep a second striker quiet.
They could have brought off Windass at that point, which would have made perfect sense, but Murty didn’t see what Brendan clearly could.
McGregor forced their midfield two to make choices, and those choices left space to exploit.
And with a second striker on, we had the players to do just that.
It took less than two minutes.
Think about that. Whilst they were still trying to adapt to the change, we cut them to pieces.
Not only is that a tribute to Brendan’s managerial vision, but it’s a tribute to how well drilled these players are in how to respond to his changes. The speed with which that change paid dividends is extraordinary and shows that these things aren’t done in the moment … a good manager drills this stuff into his players, so that when a change is made everyone is instantly adaptive to it. He confirmed this in the interview. It’s superb foresight.
Watch the third goal.
Brown gets in front of a misplaced pass on the left side of the midfield. He touches the ball down to Ntcham. Look at the positions of the Sevco players; there are two over trying to mark our two, which hasn’t just stretched them to the limit but has opened up acres of space for McGregor to take the pass.
In that moment, we, the team with ten men, seem to have extra players everywhere.
Look at the space Dembele is in to receive the ball from him.
Look how much room Edouard has to run onto.
Their midfield had too many jobs to do; that’s the genius of what Brendan did.
Where’s Tavernier when Dembele puts it on to his fellow Frenchman?
He’s still behind the play, having moved out of position to help cover Brown and Ntcham earlier.
And it’s into the space Tavernier should be where Odsonne runs, with all the room to run in the world, and when he cuts inside both central defenders come to meet him, but too late because he’s already stepped to the right and seen the goal gaping.
At that point, we were on top of it. No matter what they did from that moment on, the tactical battle had already been won and lost. Murty could have made a change to snatch a draw but by then the pressure on him was intense … and he flubbed the final call.
Murty Makes A Change. The Wrong One. Brendan Exploits His Naivety One Last Time.
Murty attempted one last throw of the dice; he took off Goss and put on Cummings.
But that mistake was characteristically stupid.
Their midfield was already being overwhelmed.
It was a move that paid no dividends whatsoever.
In leaving on his wide players in the hope they would produce he made one of the most flawed substitutions I’ve ever seen.
The irony is that they almost got something out of it anyway. For one of the few times in the game, Windass got behind our defence and our midfield wasn’t on hand to stop the pass. He forced the keeper into a great save but Morelos should have stuck it away.
It would have been a moment of freak luck.
It was the only chance they created with two strikers on the park, and Cummings wasn’t involved in it at all.
We had fallen back by then, playing deeper, to see out the game.
Yet Brendan had one more card to play to assure that the door was closed. He brought off Dembele to put on yet another central midfielder.
He brought Brown even deeper. Had the game gone on a further five minutes I do believe our overwhelming superiority in midfield would have secured us another goal. Murty kept faith with Candelas and Murphy for reasons he’ll have to explain to his fans. The decision to keep on Windass was patently ludicrous, and yet he managed to create their only decent chance in the second half … Murty would have felt vindicated had it worked but that doesn’t mean it was right.
Brown and Ntcham cut off the supply to their forward players for 80% of the game, which is why Brown was being talked about with such praise afterwards and Ntcham won the Sky man of the match. They were imperious. Yet Murty utterly failed to bring on an extra man in the middle to help his beleaguered players. It was an obvious move … and when he didn’t make it Brendan exploited it to the full. And this justified his selection of subs.
Look at the guys we didn’t bring on; Sinclair, Musonda, Roberts. Wide players. Wingers, in a game where they were being strangled of any opportunities. The whole game was in the middle of the pitch, which is why it was Armstrong who came on late.
Tactical Awareness And Preparation, Preparation, Preparation.
Good players win games, it’s true, and we had some fine performances yesterday. But we had superb footballers at Ibrox who didn’t even make it onto the pitch. It’s great managers who change, and win, more games than skilful players do and when Brendan goes on TV to remind us that he and the team train for playing with ten men you know that he’s not lying. It was obvious all through the last half hour.
This team does immense preparatory work before games. He and the coaches drill them in coping with various scenarios. When a sudden change is needed everyone knows where he should be at once. That’s an often overlooked part of the manager’s job, and it’s one that so far no computer game has been able to replicate.
The rest is pure managerial gut instinct, and the ability to see the whole picture from a seat on the touchline. Football Manager cheats on your behalf; it allows a virtual manager to study a “heat-map” of the areas of the pitch where the game is mostly being played; if all the action is on the right side of the pitch you can see that. If that area is proving successful for you then you double down and exploit it to the full. If not, you change and play a different way.
A manager like Brendan has to keep the heat-map in his head. He can see from the touchline what’s happening but from that angle it must be very difficult to see everything that’s going on. That’s why some bosses prefer to work from the stand, where they can see more of the pitch. Imagine the mental acuity it takes to do your job with only a sidelong view? Most FM players prefer the 2D top-down pitch; all the better to see where the weak spots in a formation are.
Brendan saw everything from his vantage point though, almost as if he had a top-down view of the game in his head, and could view the heat-map from his position in the dugout. He knew where we were having joy and not … he knew where the crucial battles were being won and lost. He made the first substitution with minutes of the red card. It took him seven more to see that restoring our one-man advantage in the middle would be crucial.
He moved with speed, in part so that Murty wouldn’t have chance to do it first. But he needn’t have worried; he saw what the Sevco boss hadn’t. The three man midfield plus two strikers gave them more than they could cope with and within just 100 seconds we had the goal.
Genius from Brendan. Sheer genius.
The man has had some stick in recent months. English hacks have sneered at the idea that he’s cut out for life in the EPL. What nonsense. Anyone who watched that game yesterday would have seen a tactical and coaching masterclass. We won because of it.
And it’s why we can have great faith in this man going forward. He does this in so many games. He analyses the game as it’s happening and adapts accordingly. He doesn’t always get it right, but he has the guts to trust his ideas, and they so often pay off.
I have sometimes criticised the man for starting games with the same system over and over again; it becomes predictable. But he so often makes changes that are not, and that seem to defy convention and expectation.
I said last week that if we played two strikers we’d get joy out of them. This seemed evident from a read on how well we played in the second half against Morton and from how rigid Murty’s own system is. But not in a million years would I have brought on a second striker a man down at Ibrox with the score poised at 2-2.
I wouldn’t have seen it. And I wouldn’t have the bottle even if I had. The amazing thing is that the professional football boss in the other dugout didn’t see it either, not even after the goal had been scored. Brendan is streets ahead of him.
Brendan is streets ahead of every boss in Scotland, and most in Britain.
How lucky we are to have this guy at the helm.
Join the best Celtic Facebook Group there is right here.
Like our Facebook page and comment on and share the articles by clicking here.
You can also follow us on Twitter at @The_Celtic_Blog